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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2012 and 2016 elections are estimated to have cost more
than $6 billion.1 The 2012 election cost roughly $700 million more
than the previous high, even after accounting for inflation. 2 The
difference between 2012 and past elections was the changes in
campaign finance laws brought about by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens United v. FEC in 2010.3 Citizens United, and
subsequent decisions based on its holding, were estimated to have

1. Matea Gold, 2012 Campaign Set to Cost a Record $6 Billion, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 31, 2012), articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/31/news/la-pn-2012-campaign-cos
ts-6-billion-20121031.
2. Center for Responsive Politics, OPENSECRETS.ORG, www.opensecrets.org
/ (last visited Oct 12, 2017).
3. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
19
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legalized $1.3 billion in outside independent expenditures, which is
election spending that is not coordinated with a particular
candidate.4
Many citizens were united by the decision, united in the belief
that this level of political spending was problematic. 5 Grass-roots
efforts by social groups started, aimed to bring attention to the
problem of money in politics, advocating legislation, regulation, and
even Constitutional Amendments.6
One of the primary complaints about the Citizens United
decision was that it extended First Amendment protection to
corporations when the corporation spent money on political
advertising.7 This offended those who felt that the protections of the
Constitution were intended for natural persons, and concerned
those who felt that corporation’s deep pockets would dominate the
political arena and drown out the voices of other speakers in an
attempt to curry favor with politicians and ensure corporate
friendly election results.8
Although it seems clear that the new campaign finance
landscape created by the Citizens United decision increased overall
campaign spending, it is less clear if it opened the floodgates for
spending by corporations rather than natural persons. Most experts
who have attempted to estimate the source of political spending
have admitted that it is not possible to determine what percentage
of spending came from corporations. 9 At least one estimate found by
watchdog groups estimated that corporations contributed $75
million to political action committees, otherwise known as Super
PACs.10 Considering Super PACs are estimated to have spent just
4. Lindsay Young, Outside Spenders Return on Investment, SUNLIGHT
FOUNDATION (Dec. 17, 2012), reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012/return_o
n_investment/.
5. Dan Eggan, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on
Campaign Financing, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2010), articles.washington
post.com/2010-02-16/politics/36773318_1_corporations-unions-new-limits.
6. See Caitlin McNeal, Citizens United Constitutional Amendments
Introduced In The Senate, HUFFINGTON POST, (June 19, 2013), www.huffingto
npost.com/2013/06/19/citizens-united-constitutional-amendment_n_3465636.ht
ml
7. Harry Bradford, Americans Disagree With Mitt Romney: Corporations
Aren't People, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2012), www.huffingtonpost.com/20
12/01/24/corporations-are-people-argument-rejected-most-americans_n_12283
01.html.
8. See, e.g., End Corporate Rule. Legalize Democracy, MOVE TO AMEND, mov
etoamend.org.
9. Eduardo Porter, Get What You Pay For? Not Always, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6,
2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/11/07/business/pitfalls-of-spending-on-politics.h
tml?pagewanted=all
10. Michael Beckel and Reity O'Brien, Mystery Firm is Election’s Top
Corporate Donor at $5.3 Million, OPEN SECRETS BLOG, www.opensecrets.org/ne
ws/2012/11/mystery-firm-is-elections-top-corpo.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2018)
(combined effort of Center for Public Integrity and Center for Responsive
Politics).
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under $700 million, it does not seem that corporations were the
largest driver of the increase in spending.11 In fact, at least one
individual is estimated to have spent almost twice that much on his
own.12
Some feel this number is likely to be a low estimate, because of
the incentives corporations may have not to disclose donations and
laws that currently leave several avenues for corporations to donate
without disclosure.13 However, others have argued that
corporations are actually unlikely to become major political
spenders because alienating potential customers is almost always
bad for business and remaining neutral seems the safest plan of
action.14
Regardless of whether the fear of the influence of corporate
spending on the democratic process is justified, the Citizens United
decision placed the First Amendment rights of corporations on the
front page, and the question of whether the Supreme Court should
fully protect corporate political speech is an important one. In this
comment, I attempt to use the economic methodology developed by
Richard Posner and others to analyze the costs and benefits of
regulating corporate political speech.
Posner and other law and economics scholars have argued that
economic models and concepts can be illuminating for legal
analysis, even outside of traditionally market driven activities. 15
Given that the First Amendment protection has long been tied to
the analogy of a “marketplace of ideas,” Posner and others have
attempted to use market concepts to enhance our understanding of
the tradeoffs involved in First Amendment decisions. 16
In this comment, I apply this analytic framework to corporate
political speech for the first time. Additionally, I enhance the
framework by incorporating the legitimate concerns and criticisms
raised by the behavioral law and economics movement, concerns
about the way traditional economic modeling has failed to reflect
the process of actual human decision making. I take these
11. Id.
12. Peter H. Jones, Sheldon Adelson Spent Far More On Campaign Than
Previously Known, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2012), www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/12/03/sheldon-adelson-2012-election_n_2223589.html.
13. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate
Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923 (2013).
14. Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right
That Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 639, 639 (2011).
15. See Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1964); R. H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64
AM. ECON. REV. 384, 385 (1974); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic
Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986); see Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as
Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76
TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 11 (2003).
16. See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986).
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considerations seriously, and where appropriate, incorporate them
into the traditional law and economics model as developed by
Posner.
Looking at corporate political speech through the framework of
the “marketplace of ideas,” I will be able to isolate the many and
diverse variables the Supreme Court has considered in the long line
of cases that considered independent expenditures and corporate
political speech. By isolating the variables and analyzing them in
the market model, I can simplify and clarify exactly what is at stake
when deciding whether or not to suppress political speech by
corporations and what harms may result from protecting it. Many
of the arguments raised about the regulation of corporate political
speech currently are focused on the emotional concerns about the
role of corporations in politics or the theoretical concerns about the
way corporate political speech will impact elections. Several focus
on questions that the courts have long settled, like whether money
can be equated with speech or whether First Amendment protection
is extended to corporations. Most of these oversimplify or
misunderstand the extensive case law and the important balancing
that courts must engage in when determining whether to suppress
speech in the name of protecting society. Applying a law and
economics framework helps to highlight the real tradeoffs present
in any such regulation and the impact of speech regulations at every
level of the marketplace of ideas.
This exercise is valuable in two ways. First, it highlights the
risk of legal error involved in regulations of corporate political
speech and helps focus on possible ways to mitigate said error that
could either create new ways of justifying such regulation or allow
opponents to anticipate and defend the value of the speech. Second,
it extends the application of the law and economics framework to a
significant area of speech where it has not previously been applied
and allows for a better understanding of both the value and
limitations of economic reasoning in legal considerations.
This comment is organized as follows: First, the roots of the
marketplace of ideas analogy is examined and the significance of
this concept to the application of economic principles to free speech
analysis is explored. Next, the marketplace concept is employed to
isolate the three key variables that are consistently mentioned in
decisions and commentary and that fit within the market of ideas
framework: the speech itself, the speaker, and the audience.
Finally, these variables are evaluated using an economic free speech
formula developed by Posner in an attempt to create a complete
understanding of the issues at hand in cases involving corporate
political speech.
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II. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas--that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.17

The “marketplace of ideas” as a model for First Amendment
analysis was first suggested by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the
above quotation, with his language about a “free trade in ideas.” 18
Holmes’ basic concept is that the best available method for
determining truth is to allow individuals to freely evaluate ideas
and see which ideas carry the day.19
Although specific individuals may disagree, the stronger ideas
will endure over time and the wisdom of the crowd will correct for
individual mistakes.20 Free from government regulation, ideas,
even ideas that people find abhorrent, evil and offensive, can
compete and be evaluated on their merits and the truth embodied
within them.21 Discussion and debate will expose the weaknesses of
bad ideas and allow the better more truthful ideas to win out.22
The Supreme Court has often embraced the marketplace of
ideas concept,23 including in many cases dealing with corporate

17. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
18. A similar sentiment can be found much earlier in the first inaugural
address of Thomas Jefferson. “If there be any among us who would wish to
dissolve this Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed
as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where
reason is left free to combat it. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar.
4, 1801), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 492, 493 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.
1984).
19. Gregory Brazeal, How Much Does a Belief Cost?: Revisiting the
Marketplace of Ideas, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (2011).
20. See Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free Market Approach for
Economic Expression, 17 COMM. L. & POL'Y 21, 24-29 (2012) (arguing that in
order “[t]o properly function, public discussion must exist in an open, selfregulating marketplace”).
21. W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas,
73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40 (1996).
22. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2363 (2000) (“The theory of the
marketplace of ideas focuses on ‘the truthseeking function’ of the First
Amendment.”).
23. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 320-21 (1977) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“we must rely on the capacity of the free marketplace of ideas to
distinguish that which is useful or beautiful from that which is ugly or
worthless”); Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandies, J.,
concurring) (praising the “power of reason as applied through public
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political speech.24 Although the justices have rarely applied it with
specific reference to economic reasoning, the concept has naturally
proven attractive to many legal scholars, particularly those in the
law and economics tradition.25 It is an explicit example of the
possibility of applying market concepts to activities that take place
outside a recognized commercial market. 26
As critics have pointed out, the validity of the concept of a
marketplace of ideas requires several assumptions. First and
foremost is the idea that “truth” as a concept exists and can be
discovered in some objective way.27 This aligns with the general
negative critique of law and economics that it asserts a false sense
of objectivity.28 Some have argued that information is not inherently
true, and that this type of reasoning can result in post-hoc
rationalization that if an idea wins the day then it must have been
the best and most true idea.29
Another criticism is that the marketplace, like economic theory
in general, relies to some degree on the ability of individuals to
discussion”); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 642 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“The antidote which the Constitution provides against zealots who
would inject sectarianism into the political process is to subject their ideas to
refutation in the marketplace of ideas and their platforms to rejection at the
polls.”); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(“These test-related distinctions reflect the constitutional importance of
maintaining a free marketplace of ideas.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail. . . .”).
24. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010) (“Austin
interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First
Amendment.”); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 494 (2007) (“Under
these circumstances, ‘[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable
burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case
litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected speech—harming not
only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas.’”(Scalia, J. concurring)(quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S.
113, 119 (2003))); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
(“Such expenditures may be viewed as seriously threatening the role of the First
Amendment as a guarantor of a free marketplace of ideas.” (White, J.,
dissenting)).
25. See Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1964); R. H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64
AM. ECON. REV. 384, 385 (1974); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic
Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986); see Paul Horwitz, Free Speech
as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First Amendment,
76 TEMPLE L. REV. 1, 11 (2003).
26. Coase, supra note 25.
27. See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE L.J., 1, 31 (‘Truth and understanding are actually nothing more
than preconditioned choice.’).
28. See JAMES R. HACKNEY, JR., UNDER THE COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN
LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY (2006).
29. Benjamin S. Duval, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for
Truth, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 191 (1972) (“The difficulty is that any proof
that existing beliefs are more accurate than past beliefs is inherently circular.”).
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make rational decisions when faced with multiple choices. 30 If
people are not capable of choosing the “best” idea, then a
marketplace of choices fails to produce the desired result. 31
Even if it is assumed that truth is attainable, and, more
importantly, attainable by the rational choices of individuals, there
is still an objection to the assertion that “maximizing true ideas” is
the only possible justifications for allowing freedom of speech in a
society.32 For example, this conception pays little heed to the value
of self-expression in allowing individuals to understand
themselves.33 Expressed as either self-realization or selfactualization, this theory would place the value of the expression as
benefitting the speaker, not the audience.34 Any value to society
would be secondary.35
One strong advocate of the value of speech for the sake of selfrealization and individual liberty was John Stuart Mill. According
to Mill, the domain of human liberty
comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding
liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of
thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all
subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The
liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under
a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an
individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much
importance
as
the
liberty
of
thought
itself,
and
resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable
from it.36

Mill therefore gave great deference to the right of an individual
to express ideas, even ideas rejected by the rest of society. “If all
mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were
of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in
silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would be

30. See Ingber, supra note 27 (“citizens must be capable of making
determinations that are both sophisticated and intricately rational if they are
to separate truth from falsehood. On the whole, current and historical trends
have not vindicated the market model's faith in the rationality of the human
mind. . . .”).
31. Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases,
Communications, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L.
REV. 649 (2006).
32. Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY, 1516 (1982) (questioning the value of truth seeking as a First Amendment
rationale).
33. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593
(1982).
34. Id.
35. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of
Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976-77).
36. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 5 (John Gray ed., 1998) (1859).
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justified in silencing mankind.”37 This did not mean that the
government could never suppress speech. Mill allowed that
suppression could be necessary to avoid harm. “[T]he only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.”38 Mill, therefore, approaches the value of freedom of speech
from an individual liberty perspective and still determines that the
value must be balanced against potential harm to others, with great
deference to the importance of freedom of speech.
With these concerns about the appropriateness and feasibility
of a marketplace model, why has it endured? It has been invoked
many times in Supreme Court decisions, most recently in 2012. 39
Perhaps the “marketplace of ideas” is an imperfect model for the
value of the First Amendment, but perhaps it is less imperfect than
the alternatives. One commentator analogized to Winston
Churchill’s famous remark about democracy, “[I]t has been said that
democracy is the worst form of Government—except all those others
that have been tried from time to time.”40

III. THE MARKETPLACE VARIABLES OF CORPORATE
POLITICAL SPEECH
A. Speech
The particular product involved in a market transaction can
have a significant influence on the view the law takes of the value
of the transaction. The sale of bread is treated differently from the
sale of firearms, which are treated differently from the sale of
marijuana. Not all products are seen as socially useful, and the law
has stepped in to regulate the market more directly when the item
involved has potential social harm.
The marketplace of ideas is no different. While the products in
the marketplace can all broadly be labeled speech, certain types of
speech are seen as less socially useful, and as a result, have been
more heavily regulated.41 The courts have generally allowed more
leeway in regulating speech of “low value,” despite the broad and

37. Id. at 16.
38. Id. at 9.
39. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).
40. Brazeal, supra note 19, quoting from Winston S. Churchill, Speech
Before the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in VOL. 7 WINSTON S.
CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 7566 (Robert Rhodes ed.,
1974).
41. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 432 (1992), (citing Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (“[S]uch expression constitutes ‘no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.’”).
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generic protection provided by the language of the First
Amendment.42 Pornography has been determined to have no
protection under the first amendment.43 Commercial speech,
(speech defined by the courts as “doing no more than proposing a
commercial transaction”), has been granted limited protection, and
although the standard has shifted, has consistently been afforded
less protection than more valuable forms of speech of more societal
value.44
The most valuable form of speech, according to consistent
reasoning used by the Supreme Court in a variety of contexts, is
political speech. It is for this very reason that the subject of this
comment is the rather inelegantly phrased, “corporate political
speech,” because it relates to the attempts by legislators and
members of the executive branch to limit speech of a political
nature, when spoken by certain speakers.
In Buckley v. Valeo, one of the first Supreme Court cases to
consider corporate political speech, the political nature of the speech
is the most significant and controlling aspect of the case.
The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area
of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of
public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established by
our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest
protection to such political expression in order “to assure (the)
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.” . . . Although First Amendment
protections are not confined to “the exposition of ideas,” . . . “there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs. . . . of course includ(ing) discussions of candidates . . . .”45

This language not only gives strong preference to political
speech, it implies that political speech may be considered the only
type of speech that qualifies as “the exposition of ideas.” 46 Therefore,
the concept of the marketplace of ideas would be designed to allow
people to engage in free trade of political speech.
In the next corporate political speech case, First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, the justices believed the nature of the speech
was controlling as well, and highlighted that the speech in question
was of the most important category, although the term used was

42. Id. (“. . . the ordinance bars only low-value speech, namely, fighting
words.”).
43. U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008) (“We have long held that
obscene speech—sexually explicit material that violates fundamental notions of
decency—is not protected by the First Amendment.”).
44. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
45. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
46. Id.
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“governmental affairs” rather than “political speech”. As the Court
noted:
[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of
[the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.” If the speakers here were not corporations, no
one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech.
It is the type of speech indispensable to decision-making in a
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a
corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not
depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual.47

In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, in which
limitations on corporate political speech were upheld, the Court
began by stating that the threshold question was whether the
legislation burdened political speech. “Certainly, the use of funds to
support a political candidate is “speech;” said the Court and
indicated that independent campaign expenditures were “political
expression ‘at the core of our electoral process and of the First
Amendment freedoms.’”48 Because the speech was political in
nature, the Court subjected the legislation to strict scrutiny, and
only upheld the legislation because of concerns about special
characteristics of the corporate speakers. 49
In Citizens United, the Court again highlighted the idea that
political speech is the most significant form of speech under the
First Amendment. “The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak,
and to use information to reach consensus” said the Court, “is a
precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means
to protect it. The First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent
application to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.’”50 In fact, the Court raised the suggestion that “it might be
maintained that political speech simply cannot be banned or
restricted as a categorical matter,”51 but decided instead to apply
the framework from previous cases applying strict scrutiny to laws
infringing on political speech.52

47. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978)
(internal citations omitted).
48. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990)
(internal citations omitted).
49. Id. The Michigan statute was very similar to the Massachusetts law
considered in Bellotti. The primary distinction was that the Michigan law dealt
with expenditures in support of or in opposition to any “candidate” whereas the
Massachusetts statute prohibited the spending of money on speech directed at
referenda proposed to the electorate. However, this distinction eventually
played no role in the analysis of the issues presented in the case by the Court.
50. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (internal citations
omitted).
51. Id. at 340.
52. Id. (“ . . . the quoted language from WRTL provides a sufficient
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Commentators have generally agreed that political speech is of
the highest value. In fact, several commentators have argued that
political speech may be the only type of speech that deserves
protection, and that once speech is no longer contributing to the goal
of using the “marketplace of ideas” to improve democracy, the
question of whether the First Amendment applies at all is much
closer.53
Because of the normative aspect of law and economics, it is not
enough to ask if the Court has protected political speech. The proper
question is whether protecting political speech actually assists the
stated goal, which, under the “marketplace of ideas” framework, is
the discovery of truth. With this goal in mind, the next question is
how the courts should treat false political speech. Does political
speech only have value in the market if it is true? Can the market
be expected to account for the truth or falsity of speech?
Truth was at the center of much of the discussion during the
2012 Presidential election.54 It was also at the center of a recent
Supreme Court case that did not deal directly with political
speech.55 However, the Supreme Court has never directly ruled on
a case involving false political speech in the context of an election or
other overtly political activity.56 In dicta from one case, the Supreme
Court does state that “demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by
the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful
statements.”57 To defend this proposition, the Court cited Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,58 a case involving defamation. However, the
Court also cited favorably to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,59
another defamation case in which the court ruled that defamatory
statements, which are by definition false, need to be given

framework for protecting the relevant First Amendment interests in this case.
We shall employ it here.”).
53. See, e.g., Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA.
L. REV. 477 (2011); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central
Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011); ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE (1948); C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis?, 97 VA. L. REV.
515 (2011); C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
251 (2011); James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political Legitimacy: A Response
to Ed Baker, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 366 (2011).
54. See Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and
Elections?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 53 (2013) (“It is perhaps no coincidence that the
recent election season saw both a rise in the amount of arguably false campaign
speech and the proliferation of journalistic ‘fact checkers’ who regularly rate
statements made by candidates and campaigns.”).
55. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
56. The legislation in Alvarez could have applied in political contexts, and
the Court’s discussion of this will be part of the discussion of Alvarez.
57. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982).
58. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
59. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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“breathing space” when offered in “free debate” about political
ideas.60
State courts and appellate courts have split on whether First
Amendment protection applies to false political speech. In 2011, the
Eighth Circuit considered a Minnesota law that made it a crime to
engage in false campaign speech.61 The court rejected the idea that
false speech received less protection and remanded the proceedings
to see if the Minnesota law could meet the strict scrutiny test
reserved for fully protected speech.62 The court said:
We do not, of course, hold today that a state may never regulate false
speech in this context. Rather, we hold that it may only do so when it
satisfies the First Amendment test required for content-based speech
restrictions: that any regulation be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling government interest.63

Twenty years prior to the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, the Sixth
Circuit upheld provisions of an Ohio statute that allowed for the
reprimand of candidates who made false statements with actual
malice.64 “[Supreme Court] cases indicate that false speech, even
political speech, does not merit constitutional protection if the
speaker knows of the falsehood or recklessly disregards the truth,”65
said the court. However, the Supreme Court of Washington twice
struck down similar laws, although the court divided bitterly. 66
Among the rationales on both sides, was language similar to the
discussion of the marketplace of ideas found elsewhere. Two
different opinions questioned the value of “calculated lies,” and
determined that such statements were not entitled to protection of
the First Amendment.67 However, Justice Sanders was more
concerned with the role the state intended to play in determining

60. Id. at 271-72.
61. Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 61 (2012).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 636.
64. Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commn., 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991).
65. Id. at 577. (citing Sullivan).
66. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d
691 (Wash. 1998); Rickert v. Wash. Pub. Disclosure Commn., 168 P.3d 826
(Wash. 2007) (For a full discussion of the cases and the opinions see Hasen,
supra note 54; William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First
Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 285 (2004)).
67. Washington ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No!
Committee 957 P. 2d 691, 699 (Wash. 1998) (Guy, J., concurring) (“Calculated
lies are not protected political speech. The elected representatives of the people
have the right to pass laws which make malicious lying illegal in political
campaigns; we have no constitutional duty to strike down such laws.”);
Washington ex rel., 957 P. 2d 691 at 701 (Talmadge, J. concurring)( “[We are]
the first Court in the history of the Republic to declare First Amendment
protection for calculated lies.”).
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what constituted a lie, and preferred to trust the “marketplace.” He
said:
Ultimately, the State's claimed compelling interest to shield the
public from falsehoods during a political campaign is patronizing and
paternalistic… It assumes the people of the state are too ignorant or
disinterested to investigate, learn and determine for themselves the
truth or falsity in political debate, and it is the proper role of the
government itself to fill this void.68

All of these decisions are in question following the Supreme
Court’s decision in U.S. v. Alvarez.69 Although that case did not
involve political speech, the language of the Court’s plurality
opinions have much to say on the general standing of false
statements under the First Amendment. Alvarez had publicly
stated that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor,
which was false.70 This statement violated the Stolen Valor Act. 71
The Ninth Circuit held that the Stolen Valor Act violated the First
Amendment.72 The Tenth Circuit had upheld the Act in a separate
case,73 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
split.
Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by three other justices,
began by listing the categories of speech that can be restricted based
on their content.74 Content-based restrictions on speech have been
permitted only for a few historic categories of speech, said Kennedy,
including incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to
criminal conduct, so-called fighting words, child pornography,
fraud, true threats, and speech presenting some grave and
imminent threat the Government has the power to prevent. 75
According to Kennedy, false speech, as a category, has never been
accepted by the Court.76 “This comports with the common
understanding that some false statements are inevitable if there is
to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public and private
conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to
guarantee.”77
Kennedy stressed that existing regulations of false speech
focused on the specific harm caused by the false speech. 78 Many, like

68. Id. at 698-99.
69. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
70. Id. at 2543.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 704.
72. U.S. v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), 638 F.3d 666 (9th Cir.
2011).
73. U.S. v. Strandlof, 667 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2012).
74. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2545.
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defamation and fraud, focus on financial loss or other harms. 79 The
laws prohibiting false testimony, giving false statements to the
government and falsely claiming to be a government officer, all
protect the integrity of the government.80 But the Stolen Valor Act,
according to Kennedy, “targets falsity and nothing more.”81
Justice Breyer wrote for himself and Justice Kagan provided
the other votes to hold that the act violated the Constitution. 82
However, Breyer indicated that the plurality’s approach of “strict
categorical analysis” was problematic and proposed a balancing
approach to regulations of false speech, which he likened to
“intermediate scrutiny”.83 This test would consider “the seriousness
of the speech-related harm the provision will likely cause, the
nature and importance of the provision's countervailing objectives,
the extent to which the provision will tend to achieve those
objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive ways of
doing so.”84
Significantly, for our purposes, Breyer included a paragraph
about the possibility of such a law being constructed that would
attempt to limit false political speech.
I recognize that in some contexts, particularly political contexts, such
a narrowing will not always be easy to achieve. In the political arena
a false statement is more likely to make a behavioral difference (say,
by leading the listeners to vote for the speaker) but at the same time
criminal prosecution is particularly dangerous (say, by radically
changing a potential election result) and consequently can more
easily result in censorship of speakers and their ideas. Thus, the
statute may have to be significantly narrowed in its applications.
Some lower courts have upheld the constitutionality of roughly
comparable but narrowly tailored statutes in political contexts. See,
e.g., United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America
New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 93 (C.A.2 1997) (upholding against First
Amendment challenge application of Lanham Act to a political
organization); Treasurer of the Committee to Elect Gerald D.
Lostracco v. Fox, 150 Mich.App. 617, 389 N.W.2d 446 (1986)
(upholding under First Amendment statute prohibiting campaign
material falsely claiming that one is an incumbent). Without
expressing any view on the validity of those cases, I would also note,
like the plurality, that in this area more accurate information will
normally counteract the lie.85

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2556.
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Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas,
voted to uphold the Stolen Valor Act.86 Alito argued that laws
prohibiting false speech generally have “no intrinsic First
Amendment value.”87 He argued that laws restricting false speech
are only problematic when they “present a grave and unacceptable
danger of suppressing truthful speech.” 88 He believed that the
Stolen Valor Act did not present such a threat. 89
Alito acknowledged that the at-times subjective nature of truth
can make such laws particularly dangerous.
Allowing the state to proscribe false statements in these areas also
opens the door for the state to use its power for political ends.
Statements about history illustrate this point. If some false
statements about historical events may be banned, how certain must
it be that a statement is false before the ban may be upheld? And who
should make that calculation? While our cases prohibiting viewpoint
discrimination would fetter the state's power to some degree . . . the
potential for abuse of power in these areas is simply too great.90

After Alvarez, doubts remain as to whether the Supreme Court
believes false statements can be regulated in the “marketplace of
ideas.”91 Clearly any legislation would have to be written narrowly
and deal with statements that can be objectively measured as true
or false. Even in this circumstance, there may be members of the
Court who feel that the risk of a chilling effect is greater than the
risk that the false speech will distort the market, particularly given
the faith of some of the Court that the market can correct for false
statements. When considering speech as its own variable, it is clear
that political speech is considered extremely valuable to the
marketplace of ideas, even if it is false.

B. Speaker
After establishing the extremely high value placed on political
speech, it may be surprising that there has been such a divide
amongst both judges and scholars on the issue of corporate political
speech. The divide is rarely, if ever, about the value of the speech
itself, rather the divide is over the specific producer of the speech
and how the First Amendment should apply when the producer is a
corporation.

86. Id. at 2556 (Alito, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 2560.
88. Id. at 2564.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2565 (internal citations omitted).
91. See Hasen, supra note 54; Staci Lieffring, First Amendment and the
Right to Lie: Regulating Knowingly False Campaign Speech After United States
v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047 (2013).
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In the history of corporate political speech cases, the Court has
offered varied opinions as to the proper treatment of corporations
engaged in corporate political speech. 92 Other than the dissenting
opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Bellotti, none of the opinions are
based on a legal theory of the corporation that would limit
corporations to only those rights granted to them by an individual
state incorporation statute.93
Instead, most of the discussion focuses on how the “special
advantages” of corporations allow for the accumulation of financial
“war chests” which can have “corrosive effects” on the marketplace
of ideas.94 This language first appears in Justice White’s dissent in
Bellotti, and eventually carried the day in Austin, before being
struck down in Citizens United.95
In Citizens United, Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, dissented, raising
several of the arguments for regulation from Austin, but
additionally discussing the Court’s history of determining the
extent of First Amendment protection based on the speaker’s
identity.96 He points to cases where the speech rights of students, 97

92. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (“Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation
does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons, . . . our
inquiry must seek to determine which constitutional protections are “incidental
to its very existence.”) (internal citations omitted).
94. See Bellotti, 434 U.S. 765, 804-05 (1978) (White, J., dissenting); Citizens
Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkley, Calif., 454
U.S. 290 (1981); Federal Election Com’n v. National Right to Work Committee,
459 U.S. 197, 198 (1982); Federal Election Com’n v. National Conservative
Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 490 (1985); Federal Election Com’n v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990).
95. The concept that the failure to limit independent expenditures by
entities with great wealth would enable them to create a “war chest” of funds to
overwhelm the marketplace of ideas first surfaced in an opinion by Justice
Frankfurter in the 1957 case of United States v. Auto Workers. Justice White
adopted this concept as his own in his dissent in Buckley and, as will be seen,
the term soon began to appear as language in majority opinions. Similarly, the
phrase “special advantages” twice appeared in Justice White’s dissent in
Bellotti, but was then adopted by the majority in subsequent opinions. The term
“corrosive” also emerged in Justice White’s dissent in Buckley. This language
would later be picked up by Justices Brennan and Marshall in majority
opinions.
96. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 420 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
97. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)
(“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”).
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prisoners,98 members of the armed forces,99 foreigners,100 and
government employees101 have been limited and had the limits
upheld by the Court. Stevens bases at least part of his argument on
“corporate personhood” grounds. “Campaign finance distinctions
based on corporate identity tend to be less worrisome, in other
words, because the ‘speakers’ are not natural persons, much less
members of our political community, and the governmental
interests are of the highest order.”102 He continued:
In the context of election to public office, the distinction between
corporate and human speakers is significant. Although they make
enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually
members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may
be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may
conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.
The financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation
of corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the
electoral process. Our lawmakers have a compelling constitutional
basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take measures designed to
guard against the potentially deleterious effects of corporate
spending in local and national races.103

The majority responded that the examples proffered by
Stevens of restrictions based on the speaker’s identity are united by
the idea that “there are certain governmental functions that cannot
operate without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech.” 104
The political process, the government function affected by corporate
political speech, said the majority, is not such a government
function and, in fact, “it is inherent in the nature of the political
process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse
sources in order to determine how to cast their votes.” 105
98. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119, 129 (1977) (“In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First
Amendment rights that are inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with
the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
99. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“While the members
of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First
Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the
military mission requires a different application of those protections.”).
100. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (foreign nationals may not directly or
indirectly make contributions or independent expenditures in connection with
a U.S. election).
101. See, e.g., Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)
(upholding statute prohibiting Executive Branch employees from taking “any
active part in political management or in political campaigns” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
102. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 424 (2010) (Stevens J.,
dissenting).
103. Id. at 394.
104. Id. at 341.
105. Id.
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Unlike the discussion about the value of political speech, which
finds support in both the relevant case law and scholarly discussion,
the legal academy has been much more divided about whether the
Citizens United stance of equivocation with regard to corporations
and individuals is prudent. 106 The objections are many, and range
from corporate theory,107 to the possibility of corruption,108 to the
danger of corporate speech distorting the “marketplace of ideas.”109
The most frequent objection relates to corporate theory and the
concept of extending First Amendment rights to corporations. 110
This, more than any other aspect of Citizens United and the debate
over corporate political speech, has captured the popular
imagination, resulting in attempts to pass legislation or even a
Constitutional amendment that would explicitly state that
Constitutional guarantees are intended for natural persons. 111
106. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124
HARV. L. REV. 143, 156-57 (2010) (Several articles will be cited throughout this
discussion, but any scholarly treatment of Citizens United will be necessarily
selective, the case has been cited in more than 1,400 law review articles since it
came down in 2010. In fact, the term “Citizens United” has appeared in the title
of almost 200.).
107. See David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law:
Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1197,
1219 (2011); Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of
Corporate Citizenship, 44 CONN. L. REV. 575, 584 (2012); Wayne Batchis,
Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From Freedom of
Association to Freedom of The Association, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5,
39 (2012); Jessica A. Levinson, We the Corporations? The Constitutionality of
Limitations on Corporate Elections Speech after Citizens United, 46 U.S.F. L.
REV. 307, 323-24, 329-30 (2011); Jarrod L. Schaeffer, Note, The Incorporation of
Democracy: Justice Kennedy's Philosophy of Political Participation in Citizens
United, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1783. But see, e.g., Ilya Shapiro & Caitlyn W. McCarthy,
So What If Corporations Aren't People?, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 701 (2011).
108. See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118
(2010) (arguing for a reorientation of concept of corruption to focus on avoidance
of “clientelist” relation between elected officials and interested parties); see also
Ofer Raban, Constitutionalizing Corruption: Citizens United, Its Conceptions of
Political Corruption, and the Implications for Judicial Elections Campaigns, 46
U.S.F. L. REV. 359, 382 (2011) (interpreting the Court's decision as the
“constitutionalization of political corruption”). But see Stephen E. Sachs,
Corruption, Clients, and Political Machines: A Response to Professor
Issacharoff, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 63 (2010).
109. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion
Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 992 (2011); Sullivan, supra note 106. But
see Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect, and
Repetition in Public Debate, 75 MO. L. REV. 143, 160-63 (2010).
110. Reza Dibadj, Citizens Divided on Citizens United: Campaign Finance
Reform and the First Amendment: Citizens United as Corporate Law Narrative,
16 NEXUS: J. OP. 39, 39 (2010-2011); Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First
Amendment Rights After Citizens United: An Analysis of the Popular Movement
to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209
(2011); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional
Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 225 (2011).
111. See Caitlin McNeal, Citizens United Constitutional Amendments
Introduced In The Senate, Huffington Post, HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2013),
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Although this is an important debate, it is less clear how it
applies to the marketplace of ideas. Without compelling evidence
that the identity of the speaker leads to specific harm, the
marketplace goal of determining truth should be independent of the
source of the ideas being considered. Stevens’ assertion that
corporations are not “part of the political community” 112 is rarely
echoed in other decisions and seems inconsistent with the
marketplace of ideas concept that seeks to allow speech to be
evaluated on its own merits.
At the same time, if the Court or a legislature succeeded in
establishing that corporations are not protected by the First
Amendment, then Posner’s economic calculus, which determines
the balance of when to suppress otherwise protected speech, would
be irrelevant.
There are two remaining objections to unregulated corporate
political speech that relate to the speaker’s identity. One is the risk
of corruption, and the other is the risk of distortion. At the outset,
it is necessary to explain that these are two distinct harms. Justice
Marshall, writing in Austin, combined the two, when he stated that
“Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the
political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas.”113
It is possible to respect the harm caused by distortion without
equating it to corruption, a term that has traditionally been
defined by the court quite differently.114 As commentators have
pointed out, Marshall’s definition of corruption is problematic.
This view defines corruption poorly, and makes corruption appear as
a “derivative” problem from broader societal inequalities. As
formulated in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the
only case to adopt squarely the distortion of electoral outcomes view
of corruption, the inequities born of wealth are compounded by the
unnatural ability of corporations to amass wealth more readily than
can individuals. This argument logically extends to all disparities in
electoral influence occasioned by differences in wealth.115

www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/19/citizens-united-constitutional-amendm
ent_n_3465636.html.
112. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 424 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
113. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990)
114. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia J., dissenting) (“The Court does not
try to defend the proposition that independent advocacy poses a substantial risk
of political “corruption,” as English speakers understand that term. Rather, it
asserts that that concept (which it defines as “ ‘financial quid pro quo ’
corruption,” ante, at 1397) is really just a narrow subspecies of a hitherto
unrecognized genus of political corruption.”).
115. See Issacharoff, supra note 108.
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Corruption, as traditionally defined, was at the heart of the
legislation being considered in Buckley, the forefather of most
corporate political speech cases. 116 The legislation applied equally
to individuals and corporations, so corruption was not yet a concern
specifically related to the speaker’s identity, 117 Buckley established
two ways in which corruption could justify suppressing otherwise
protected speech.118 The first is the real danger of quid-pro-quo
arrangements between politicians and those who would either
contribute money directly or spend money independently to support
a candidate.119 “To the extent that large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders,” said the majority, “the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined.” 120 The second danger
results from what would be termed the “appearance of corruption”,
and referred to activity that would reflect poorly on the democratic
system and could shake public confidence in government. “Of
almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption
stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.” 121
The majority in Buckley found the danger of corruption or the
appearance of corruption compelling for limiting campaign
contributions, but rejected it as a compelling rationale for limiting
independent expenditures.122 “The absence of prearrangement and
coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent” said
the Court, “not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the
candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the
candidate.”123 Buckley stands for the proposition that independent
expenditures, regardless of the speaker’s identity, do not give rise
to corruption or the appearance.
The Court in Bellotti also refused to suppress political speech
through independent expenditures based on an argument for the
possibility of corruption, even when the restriction was limited to
corporations.124 However, the legislation challenged in Bellotti
applied only to corporate political speech about general ballot
measures and not to candidate elections. 125 As the majority noted,
“[t]he risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate
elections . . . simply is not present in a popular vote on a public
116. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 26.
120. Id. at 26-27.
121. Id. at 27.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 47.
124. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
125. Id.
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issue.”126 The possibility of corporate political speech leading to
corruption was mentioned in dicta in Bellotti, when the court noted
in a footnote that, “Congress might well be able to demonstrate the
existence of a danger of real or apparent corruption in independent
expenditures by corporations to influence candidate elections.” 127
In Citizens United, the majority seemed to close the door left
open by the Bellotti footnote.128 Specifically mentioning the
footnote, the Citizens United majority held that “independent
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise
to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 129 The fact “[t]hat
speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does
not mean that those officials are corrupt. And the appearance of
influence or access will not cause the electorate to lose faith in this
democracy.”130 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, specified
“those made by corporations” as an aside, but spent little energy on
the distinctions between corporations and individuals articulated
by Austin and Stevens in his Citizens United dissent.
Those distinctions, as noted above, were based on the alleged
“special characteristics” of corporations that allow them to establish
political “war chests”.131 Stevens, in his dissent in Citizens United,
as well as several subsequent commentators, disagree with the
conclusion of the Citizens United majority, arguing that the
speaker’s corporate identity gives special weight to the probability
of corruption.132 Stevens asserted that corporations “are uniquely
equipped to seek laws that favor their owners, not simply because
they have a lot of money but because of their legal and
organizational structure.”133 According to Stevens, corporations
have several features that increase the likelihood of actual
corruption. “The unparalleled resources, professional lobbyists, and
single-minded focus they bring to this effort, I believed, make quid
pro quo corruption and its appearance inherently more likely when
they (or their conduits or trade groups) spend unrestricted sums on
elections.”134
In addition to an increased risk of actual corruption, Stevens
highlights the concerns regarding the appearance of corruption
brought on by corporate political speech, noting that:
A Government captured by corporate interests, [the public] may come
to believe, will be neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give
their views a fair hearing. The predictable result is cynicism and

126. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790.
127. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26.
128. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010)
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765.
132. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 471 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 454.
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disenchantment: an increased perception that large spenders ‘call the
tune’ and a reduced ‘willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance.’135

The anti-distortion rationale is based on concerns by some
members of the Court that economic power might be transformed
into political power through the political marketplace. This
argument has also been called the “leveling the playing-field”
rationale, although some proponents of the rationale may believe
that there is a distinction between leveling the playing field and
limiting distortion.
The Court has explicitly refused to recognize this rationale as
a potential compelling interest. In a later case, the Court noted that
“[t]his Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that the
government has a compelling state interest in ‘leveling the playing
field’ that can justify undue burdens on political speech.” 136 The
majority opinion in Buckley had rejected this idea from the
beginning, when it said that the Court had no interest, compelling
or otherwise, “in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections.” 137 Citizens United
relied explicitly on this language.138
Stevens maintains that the rationale in Austin that considered
distortion to be a form of corruption, was based on an issue that
Stevens asserts can be separated from equalization or leveling.139
That rationale was based on the “corrosive effects” of corporate
wealth on the political system.140 According to this view, corporate
wealth is corrosive because corporations can amass large “war
chests” because of their “special characteristics.” 141 In this view,
“[t]he majority's unwillingness to distinguish between corporations
and humans similarly blinds it to the possibility that corporations’
‘war chests’ and their special ‘advantages’ in the legal realm, . . .
may translate into special advantages in the market for
legislation.”142
Because of their special advantages, critics suggest that
corporations may drown out other voices and monopolize the
market for political speech.143 “[W]hen corporations grab up the
prime broadcasting slots on the eve of an election,” said Stevens,
“they can flood the market with advocacy that bears ‘little or no
correlation’ to the ideas of natural persons or to any broader notion
135. Id. at 472.
136. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct.
2806 (2011) (striking down public financing scheme providing for equalizing
funds to match independent expenditures)
137. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976).
138. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350.
139. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990).
141. Id.
142. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 471.
143. Id.
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of the public good, … The opinions of real people may be
marginalized,”144 which may decrease the ability of individuals to
weigh all ideas and arrive at truth. 145
According to Stevens, “Austin ' s ‘concern about corporate
domination of the political process,’ . . . reflects a concern to
facilitate First Amendment values by preserving some breathing
room around the electoral ‘marketplace’ of ideas . . . the marketplace
in which the actual people of this Nation determine how they will
govern themselves.”146 Despite the language in Citizens United
declaring that corporate expenditures on political speech do not give
rise to corruption, and despite the language stating that
“antidistortion” is not a compelling interest, the question remains
whether either rationale can justify the suppression of corporate
political speech based on the speaker’s identity when using the
normative law and economics framework below.

C. Audience
The “marketplace of ideas” analogy puts a premium on the
effect that speech has on others. The underlying rationale for
allowing speech is that it may be of some value for those who hear
it in allowing them to arrive at truth. Therefore, the audience (i.e.
the “consumers” in the marketplace) are possibly the most
important players when considering the effects of speech regulation.
The Court has considered the audience an important variable
in First Amendment cases in several contexts. In cases regarding
incitement, for example, the Court has determined that the
likelihood of the speech to bring about specific negative responses
from the audience is the determining factor in whether the speech
can be suppressed.147 In an early incitement case that used the clear
and present danger standard, Justice Brandeis argued that given
time, the audience could filter through harmful speech and arrive
at truth.
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present,
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it
may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify
repression.148

In other contexts, considerations about audience impact have
led to more paternalistic practices. The Commercial Speech
144. Id. at 470 (internal citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 473.
147. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
148. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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Doctrine, has often considered the effect of speech on listeners. In
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the
Court upheld a ban on casino gambling advertising that was based
on the assumption that advertising would entice residents to
gamble, proving harmful to their collective “health, safety and
welfare”.149 This concern about audience reaction to speech was a
“substantial” interest for the government, upholding the regulation
to suppress speech.150 The Court rejected the argument that the less
burdensome solution to combating the problems associated with
gambling advertising would have been to rely on the marketplace of
ideas.151 The Court left it “up to the legislature to decide whether or
not such a ‘counterspeech’ policy would be as effective in reducing
the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising.” 152
Other commercial speech cases have also discussed the impact
of the speech on the audience, but have followed the trust-ofaudience rationality found in the traditional rationale for the
“marketplace of ideas.” For example, in 44 Liquor Mart, Inc.:
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and
cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish.
Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But
the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the
government, assess the value of the information presented. Thus,
even a communication that does no more than propose a commercial
transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.153

The Court concluded that “[p]recisely because bans against
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech rarely seek to protect
consumers from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest
solely on the offensive assumption that the public will respond
‘irrationally’ to the truth.”154
In the corporate political speech debate, both sides invoke the
rights of the audience as rational for either upholding or
overturning limitations on corporate political speech. Justice
Stevens, in Citizens United, argued that there must be a balance
between the right of the corporate speakers and the right of the
audience to hear a variety of views. According to Stevens:
[concern about corporate domination] reflects a concern to facilitate
First Amendment values by preserving some breathing room around
the electoral “marketplace” of ideas, the marketplace in which the
actual people of this Nation determine how they will govern

149. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates, dba Condado Holiday Inn v.
Tourism Company of Puerto Rico et al., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (citing Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761 (1993)).
154. Id. at 503.
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themselves. The majority seems oblivious to the simple truth that
laws such as § 203 do not merely pit the anticorruption interest
against the First Amendment, but also pit competing First
Amendment values against each other. There are, to be sure, serious
concerns with any effort to balance the First Amendment rights of
speakers against the First Amendment rights of listeners. But when
the speakers in question are not real people and when the appeal to
“First Amendment principles” depends almost entirely on the
listeners' perspective, it becomes necessary to consider how listeners
will actually be affected.155

On the other side of the debate, Justice Kennedy’s concern is
the suppression of corporate political speech that would itself lead
to the electorate being “deprived of information, knowledge and
opinion vital to its function.”156 According to Kennedy:
When the FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit speech, “[m]any
persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and
sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case
litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected
speech—harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which
is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”157

Even if both sides rely at times on the assumption of rationality
from the audience, there is a distinction in how each feels about the
potential of a high volume of speech to allow audiences to arrive at
truth. Justice Scalia sums up the position that the marketplace is
better served by more speech by noting “[t]he premise of our system
is that there is no such thing as too much speech—that the people
are not foolish but intelligent, and will separate the wheat from the
chaff.”158 Stevens on the other hand, is concerned about the impact
of high volume of speech on the market.
If individuals in our society had infinite free time to listen to and
contemplate every last bit of speech uttered by anyone, anywhere;
and if broadcast advertisements had no special ability to influence
elections apart from the merits of their arguments (to the extent they
make any); and if legislators always operated with nothing less than
perfect virtue; then I suppose the majority's premise would be
sound.159

A number of scholars have expressed reservations about the
faith the Court has shown in the audience to process information
and have argued that faith in the rationality of the audience is
nothing but faith, often divorced from statistical evidence and

155. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 473 (2010).
156. Id. at 354 (internal citations omitted).
157. Id. at 335 (internal citations omitted).
158. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 258-59 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
159. Id. at 472.
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psychological understanding of human behavior.160 For example, in
language similar to that of Stevens above, Stanley Ingber contends
that the audience is less capable of making informed decisions
regarding the information in the marketplace than the model
suggests.
[R]eal world conditions . . . interfere with the effective operation of
the marketplace of ideas: sophisticated and expensive communication
technology, monopoly control of the media, access limitations suffered
by disfavored or impoverished groups, techniques of behavior
manipulation, irrational responses to propaganda . . . all conflict with
marketplace ideals.161

Specific concerns, reflected in the statements above, include
the inability of individuals to avoid being manipulated by messages
because of framing effects,162 the use of heuristics and cues to make
decisions in the face of bounded rationality, 163 and the negative
impact of too much information on efficient decision-making.164
Many of these concerns have their origin in the work of behavioral
psychology and its impact on economics and law. 165
Scholars assert that framing can be used to manipulate public
opinion. According to Derek Bambauer, for example, “[t]he
marketplace of ideas model holds that people arrive at truth
160. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, How Humans Make Political Decisions, 41
JURIMETRICS J. 337, 343 (2001); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetrical
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1219-23 (2003); Paul Horwitz, Free
Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First
Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2003); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing
Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and
“Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141 (2003).
161. Ingber, supra note 27, at 5.
162. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Robert H. Frank, The
Frame of Reference as a Public Good, 107 ECON. J. 1832-847 (1997).
163. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness
and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285, S290 (1986); Daniel
Kahneman, Jack Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986); Daniel
Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Daniel
Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Economic Analysis and the Psychology of
Utility: Applications to Compensation Policy, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 341-46 (1991);
Richard H. Thaler, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman & Alan Schwartz, The
Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test, 112
Q. J. ECON. 647, 647-48 (1997).
164. See Bambauer, supra note 31, at 697; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159,
1196 (2003); see also GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY 62, 80 (1988).
165. See CHRISTINE JOLLS, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, & RICHARD H. THALER, A
BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, 13, IN BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS (CASS SUNSTEIN ED., 2001).
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regardless of how it is framed or presented, but the radically
different success of reforms of the ‘estate tax’ and the ‘death tax,’ …
demonstrate[s] the falsity of this conclusion.”166 In the area of
commercial speech, scholars have long argued that sophisticated
speakers can manipulate messages to take advantage of the
framing biases found in the average audience. 167 With an economic
motive to maximize return on investment, there are reasons to
believe that political advertisements from corporations and others
can have the same manipulating impact.168
The idea that voters may use heuristics and cues to vote also
runs contrary to some aspects of a rational audience assumption.169
However, some have argued that economic theory actually predicts
voters will act irrationally in making political choices, and that their
behavior is actually rational.170 Gaining information is costly, at
least in terms of the time spent and the opportunity costs associated
with that time, and the likelihood of a single vote deciding an issue
is low.171 This has led some to refer to voter ignorance, or acceptance
of the limits of their rationality, as “rationally irrational.” 172
Regardless of whether the ignorance is rational or not, it means that
political decisions may be based on cues and heuristics rather than
careful consideration of the merits of arguments. 173
This cuts against the assumption of a “rational” audience who
can, or will, efficiently process information in the marketplace of
ideas to arrive at “truth.”174
Behavioral economists have also challenged Scalia’s
pronouncement that there is no such thing as too much speech. 175
Experiments have found that additional irrelevant information can
influence people to change a decision. 176 Assuming the new decision
is less reflective of the true choice, the additional information leads
to market inefficiencies.177 According to Mark Kelman, for example,
“[t]he problem is not a lack of adequate information—it is that we
166. See Bambauer, supra note 31, at 699.
167. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 722-43 (1999).
168. See Rubin, supra note 160.
169. Id.
170. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-76
(1957); see also BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY
DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 94 (2007).
171. CAPLAN, supra note 170.
172. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885,
928 (2006) (citing “[a] vast body of empirical studies demonstrat[ing] citizens'
lack of political knowledge,” but observing that public choice theory explains
why “the public's ignorance is rational.”).
173. See Horowitz, supra note 160.
174. Id.
175. See Sunstein et al., supra note 164.
176. Mark Kelman, et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 61 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).
177. Id.
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cannot process the data that is already out there. Injecting
additional information makes this processing problem even
worse.”178 Although technology has greatly expanded access for
speakers and opened markets to new information, the ability to
process information has not accelerated at the same rate. As
Bambauer notes, “We are shifting between scarcities: from scarcity
of communications media (such as newspapers or broadcast
frequencies) to scarcity of attention.” 179 Both proponents and
opponents of restrictions on corporate political speech appeal to the
impact of such speech on the audience (or the “consumers” in the
“marketplace of ideas”).

IV. THE MARKETPLACE VARIABLES AND POSNER’S FREE
SPEECH FORMULA
In the case of United States v. Dennis,180 Justice Learned Hand
proposed a formula for then the Court should allow the suppression
of speech. The question is “whether the gravity of the ‘evil’ i.e., if the
instigation sought to be prevented or punished succeeds, discounted
by its improbability, justifies such an invasion of speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger”.181
Posner proposes that this balancing test can be expressed as a
formula:
In symbols, regulate if but only if B less than PL, where B is the cost
of the regulation (including any loss from suppression of valuable
information), P is the probability that the speech sought to be
suppressed will do harm, and L is the magnitude (social cost) of the
harm.182

Reducing a rhetorical balancing test to a formula with
variables highlights the individual weights being given to the
various factors under consideration. Posner then suggests
expanding the formula to better reflect the component parts and to
account for additional externalities that Hand’s formula ignores.
Posner’s formula would look like this: regulate if V+E < P x L/(1 +
i)n.183 “V” is the social loss from suppressing valuable information
and “E” is the legal-error costs incurred in trying which information
is valuable and which isn’t.184 The rest of the formula is a
modification to adjust “L” (the magnitude of the social harm) for
178. Id.
179. See Bambauer, supra note 31, at 699.
180. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 206 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341
U.S. 494 (1951).
181. Id.
182. Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986) (Posner B).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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present value.185 Here “i” is an interest or discount rate for
translating future social cost into present dollar and “n” is the
number of periods between the speech and the harm. 186 The larger
i and n are, the smaller the harm will be.187 According to this
formula, government should regulate only where the social loss
(including error costs) is less than the harm caused by the speech,
accounting for the probability of the speech actually causing harm
and adjusting for present value of the harm.188
Posner proposes that speech should be restricted only when P
x L is greater than V+E. Having identified the variables considered
by the courts and the commentators when discussing corporate
political speech, the question is what impact do regulations of
corporate political speech have on the “marketplace of ideas” when
these variables are plugged into the Posner formula, as modified
where appropriate by the concerns of behavioral law and economics.

A. Speech
1. Value of Information (V)
Courts and scholars are in agreement that political speech, as
a concept, is at the core of First Amendment values and, therefore,
any limitation of political speech will result in significant social
harm.189 Very few of the justifications for suppressing corporate
political speech have been predicated on the lack of value such
speech adds and the Court has rarely considered the probability of
harm to be significant enough to justify the suppression of truthful
political speech.
However, commentators have expressed concern that false
speech is not as valuable.190 In other contexts, like commercial
speech, the Court has agreed.191 Lower courts have justified
upholding legislation that suppressed false political speech because
it could lead to voters being misinformed.192 The marketplace of
ideas framework would place a lower value on any speech that
would make the discovery of truth more difficult, including false
political speech.

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See supra note 45-52 and accompanying text.
190. Colin B. White, Comment, The Straight Talk Express: Yes We Can Have
a False Political Advertising Statute, 13 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2009).
191. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 666 (2003) (“the First Amendment,
while offering protection to truthful commercial speech, does not protect false
or misleading commercial speech.”).
192. See supra note 64-68 and accompanying text.
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2. Legal Error Costs (E)
The only argument for limiting corporate political speech that
considers the actual speech itself is the harm of false political
speech. In U.S. v. Alvarez several of the Justices joined opinions
that specifically expressed concern about the difficult task of
crafting effective legislation that would address false speech while
giving political debate the “breathing space” the Court has defended
since Sullivan.193 This indicates that even when considering false
political speech, there is reason to believe that the speech has value
that would result in social loss if suppressed and, more importantly,
that there may be significant legal error costs associated with
attempting to suppress only the false speech with the least value
and the most harm. Determining truth has traditionally been
problematic for outside groups, and the chilling effect on speech
where the truth is difficult to determine could lead to significantly
over-inclusive regulation.
3. Magnitude of Harm Adjusted to Present Value
(L/(1 + i)n)
The argument is rarely advanced that truthful political speech
is harmful in and of itself. False political speech, however, can cause
harm to the extent that it can confuse voters and mislead people.
False speech in other contexts has been determined to be harmful
enough to justify suppression, including defamatory and
commercial speech. It is also likely that the harm caused by false
speech would be imminent, because political speech is so
concentrated around times when individuals make political
decisions.
4. Probability of Harm (P)
The likelihood of harm from false political speech could be
impacted by the strength of disclosure laws that would require
speakers, including corporations, to be associated with any false
political speech they produce and the ability of the press and other
independent groups to create accountability for producers of false
speech. Although there are arguments that corporations are not
likely to engage in false political speech because it could prove
negative from a public relations perspective, this would be
dependent on the ability of the marketplace to internalize the
external harm produced by false political speech and force the
speakers to bear this cost. Whether disclosure laws and watchdog
groups can do this efficiently is unclear and additional data about

193. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
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the amount of false speech in the marketplace could impact future
calculations.
5. Determination
Applying the Posner formula to the speech itself in the case of
corporate political speech, we can see that the Court has placed high
value on political speech, even false political speech, and therefore,
it is likely that the Court would be leery of suppressing such vital
information. The Court would have to consider the likelihood of
harm to be significant enough to offset the high legal error costs
associated with attempting to isolate only that speech which is truly
harmful and of low value to the public debate. Because Posner’s
formula would rarely lead to the suppression of corporate political
speech on the basis of the speech itself, such regulation would need
to be justified on the basis of increased harm brought on by either
the speaker’s identity or the impact of the speech on the audience.

B. Speaker
1. Value of Information (V)
The analysis of the first two variables, Value and Error, will
look similar to the discussion of speech as a variable above. This is
still political speech, which has been long established as having high
value that would result in significant social loss if suppressed. An
argument that political speech produced by corporations is likely to
be of less value than other political speech is rarely considered by
the courts. The two rationales used consistently by commentators
and judges for suppressing speech on the basis of corporate identity
are an anti-distortion rationale 194 and an anti-corruption
rationale.195 Both of these are based on ideas distinct from the value
of the speech itself.
2. Legal Error Costs (E)
The error analysis would be similar regardless of whether you
were considering the corruption rationale or the distortion
rationale. Both would focus on why corporations are being targeted.
Two rationales for targeting corporations specifically are that more
speech leads to more corruption or distortion, and, therefore, if
corporations are in a unique position to produce the most political
speech, then they are the most likely candidates for bringing about
the corresponding harm. The second rationale is that corporations
are more likely than other speakers to seek favorable political
194. See supra note 136-146 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 116-135 and accompanying text.
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treatment in return for political speech in support of a candidate or
party.
There is disagreement over whether corporations are in a
unique position to produce large quantities of political speech.
Justices opposed to suppression of corporate political speech have
pointed out that corporations that actually have significant political
“war chests” are the exception and that most corporations are small
and lack significant resources.196 Therefore, suppressing the speech
of all corporations is likely to be over-inclusive with regard to how
many speakers it impacts, which is the equivalent of a legal error
cost.
However, it would be worth considering what percentage of
corporate political speech comes from small corporations and what
percentage comes from large corporations that have access to the
“war chests” that are used to justify the suppression. If “war chest”
corporations actually “produce” the vast majority of corporate
political speech, then the legal error associated with targeting
speakers based on corporate identity is less, because the
suppression of small corporation political speech would be more
hypothetical than actual.
When considering the increased likelihood that corporations
would seek favorable political treatment, the courts would need to
make assumptions about the motivations of speakers or regulate on
a case-by-case basis. For the most part, the Court has been hesitant
to consider speaker motivation. “[While] a bad motive may be
deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the
law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the
area of public debate about public figures.” 197 In several contexts,
the Court has discussed the concern that legal error is likely when
attempting to ascertain the motive of the speaker.198
3. Magnitude of Harm Adjusted to Present Value
(L/(1 + i)n)
In Citizens United, the Court rejected both the anti-corruption
and the anti-distortion arguments as compelling interests.
However, both have found favor in previous decisions, and the
normative nature of law and economics requires that they be
considered on their own merits.

196. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 354 (2010) (“96% of the 3 million
businesses that belong to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce have fewer than 100
employees.”).
197. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (“But in
the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that
are less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment.”).
198. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468 (2007)(“An intentbased standard ‘blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said,’ and ‘offers no
security for free discussion.’”).
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Evidence could be presented, and some argue has been
presented, that shows that parties that spend significant amounts
of money on political speech can extract preferential treatment from
political actors. This would be a serious harm, and even if the
favoritism happened in the future, the magnitude of the harm
would be high enough to merit serious consideration.
It is more difficult to establish a reason for considering the
speaker’s corporate identity when analyzing the anti-distortion
rationale. Ignoring the Court’s consistent rejection of any rationale
that appears to be based simply on “leveling the playing field”, the
argument would have to be based on the notion that corporate
speakers are particularly problematic when it comes to distorting
the marketplace of ideas. Most distortion rationale arguments are
based on the imagery of “flooding the marketplace” and “drowning
out” other voices. The harm would result from the information
barriers created when speakers or listeners cannot participate in a
marketplace that includes all possible viewpoints. This could
prevent the marketplace from efficiently arriving at truth. Unlike
the corruption harm, which is harm to the political system that does
not directly detract from the functioning of the marketplace of ideas,
the harm of distortion goes to the heart of the marketplace of ideas
goal of efficiency in the quest for truth.
The argument that the risk of harm is increased by the
speaker’s corporate identity has only one possible rationale when
considering distortion rather than corruption. The distortion
argument by its nature is related to the quantity of speech
produced. Evidence that corporations are in a unique position to
produce large quantities of speech likely to overwhelm the
marketplace and reduce the total number of ideas could be used to
show a high probability of harm if corporations have the right to
engage in unlimited political speech.
4. Probability of Harm (P)
Does the speaker’s corporate identity significantly increase the
probability of the harm of corruption? As mentioned above, there
are two arguments that could be made that it does. The first is that
the probability of corruption increases in correlation with the
quantity of political speech. If this is true, any speaker who
“produces” a significant amount of political speech could bring about
the likely harm of corruption. If corporations are in a unique
position to “produce” a significant amount of political speech, then
increasing the probability of harm from corporate political speech
could be justified. This is the heart of the “special characteristics”
and “war chests” language accepted by several Justices and
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commentators and, if accepted, creates a fairly strong argument for
repression.199
Another possible rationale for limiting political speech based
on the speaker’s corporate identity would be to establish that
corporate speakers are more likely to seek favorable treatment from
politicians and therefore the danger of corruption is higher when
the speaker is a corporation. Following this rationale, the link
between corruption and corporate identity would not be based on
the resources of the corporation relative to other potential speakers,
but rather, based on an assumption about corporate motives and
the likelihood corporations would seek or secure favoritism.
5. Determination
To avoid high legal-error costs in the formula, regulations
would need to be drawn to avoid suppressing the speech of small
corporations, and to include wealthy individuals, because the
rationale of corruption and distortion are both reliant on the ability
to produce a large quantity of speech. Such regulation ceases to be
limited to corporations and is distinct from any corporate political
speech regulation previously accepted by the Court. This type of
limitation seems very similar to the “leveling the playing field”
argument that the Court has consistently rejected. If a regulation
were only aimed at corporations, one would need to show a large
probability of significant harm in order to balance the high legalerror cost of an over/under inclusive regulation.

C. Audience
1. Value of Information (V)
The value of political speech to the audience is based on the
idea that more political speech will allow consumers to make
informed political decisions by weighing all sides of an issue. This
is why political speech has been held consistently to be of high
value.
However, the value of the speech to the audience is based on
the assumption that the members of the audience are rational
consumers of information who can use political speech efficiently to
arrive at “true” or “correct” decisions. The two possible audiencebased arguments in favor of restrictions found in both case law and
commentary are: 1) suppressing speech that is aimed at misleading
an audience that is predictably irrational in certain respect with
regards to the way messages are framed; 2) suppressing speech in
an effort to avoid “flooding” the market, which, if it occurs, will

199. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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increase the use of heuristics and limit the efficiency of information
processing.
The first argument would be predicated on the idea that speech
that seeks to manipulate audience psychology can be deemed to be
less valuable. The problem with this is that the Court has been
skeptical of regulations aimed at speech because it is likely to be
effective in influencing voter conduct. “To be sure, corporate
advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its
purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is
hardly
a
reason
to
suppress
it:
The
Constitution
‘protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is
unconvincing.’”200
It is unclear whether the evidence from behavioral economics
is strong enough to contradict the assumptions from Bellotti and
other cases that persuasive speech is effective, but not
manipulative. If clear data suggest that people can be manipulated
by particular framing methods, speech using these methods
arguably could have less value to the consumers in the marketplace
of ideas.
If the evidence that additional information can reduce efficient
decision making is accepted, the social loss from suppressing
political speech would also be lessened if it could be demonstrated
that the speech was already represented in the marketplace, and
that the additional information was redundant or superfluous.
Speech that is clearly “irrelevant” could be limited with little social
loss.
2. Legal Error Costs (E)
One consideration here is the ability of regulators to create
legislation that would effectively target only problematic speech
without chilling or suppressing otherwise valuable political speech.
In the context of corporate political speech, this is the heart of
Justice Kennedy’s concern regarding speakers who choose not to
speak rather than risk being considered in violation of a regulation
on a case-by-case basis.201 It seems likely that regulation aimed at
either improper framing methods or meant to limit redundant or
irrelevant speech could have significant legal error costs to add to
the social loss from suppressing political speech.
Both potential limitations based on the impact of speech on the
audience would have to overcome an additional factor related to
legal error. To the extent that human beings are consistently
irrational in predictable ways, there is no reason to assume that
legislators or judges would not be equally prone to errors. In fact,

200. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (citing
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959)).
201. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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experiments on the impact of irrational biases on decision making
have found that “[c]ompared to other actors, judges were just as
susceptible to anchoring, hindsight bias, and egocentric bias”. 202
These are two examples that lead to the conclusion that legal
error costs of attempting to suppress speech in an attempt to
facilitate rational decisions could be prohibitively high. At a
minimum, the corresponding probability of harm would need to be
extremely high to justify the suppression of speech in this context.
3. Magnitude of Harm Adjusted to Present Value
(L/(1 + i)n)
The marketplace of ideas framework may allow for more
leeway in justifying suppression, because the harm can be
measured in terms of the impact on the ability of the “buyers” in the
marketplace to arrive at true ideas. The harm would come from
either manipulating the irrationality of the audience through
framing or by harming the efficiency of the marketplace through
excessive information that is either redundant or irrelevant.
In the first instance, the harm of such speech would be that it
would manipulate audience members by anticipating the ways in
which they would react irrationally and tailor messages to take
advantage of this. Basically, it is the reverse of the positive
manipulation advocated by Thaler and Sunstein in their popular
book on behavioral law and economics.203 This would be harmful, if
it prevented the efficient working of the marketplace. And the harm
would be imminent to the extent it was used to influence voting
behavior in the time leading up to elections and other political
decisions.
In the second instance, the harm of the speech would be that it
would prevent efficient decision making by creating information
barriers that could prevent consumers from getting the information
they require for political decisions. In the same way that holding
relevant information back can lead to inefficient decisions, burying
relevant information in a mass of irrelevant speech could create a
lack of perfect information that the marketplace of ideas strives for
when operating at peak efficiency.
202. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside
the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 782-83 (2001) (collecting citations
for proposition that “empirical studies demonstrate that cognitive illusions
plague assessments that many professionals, including doctors, real estate
appraisers, engineers, accountants, options traders, military leaders, and
psychologists, make. Even lawyers fall prey to cognitive illusions.”); see also
Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same
Way Everybody Else Does-- Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 118-38 (2002) (discussing heuristics judges employ
in order to avoid complexity).
203. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
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4. Probability of Harm (P)
Evidence from behavioral law and economics is largely
tangential to actual political decision-making and the impact of
political speech. However, the findings of behavioral economists
may be generalized to electoral decision-making and provide some
hard evidence that actual inefficiencies are likely to be created by
messages framed to take advantage of irrational decision making
and by high quantities of speech that raise information barriers that
limit the ability of consumers to find relevant information.
Some critics have argued that the irrational behavior that has
been consistently demonstrated in experiments has not been
established in real world conditions.204 This is worth noting, but
there is one important counterargument. The argument is premised
on the idea that people have stronger motivations to avoid irrational
decisions outside the controlled environment of an experiment.
However, as mentioned above, there is some evidence that the
motivation of voters to become informed about political decisions is
also low, so it is possible the experimental results would be
consistent with real world decision making with low motivation. 205
5. Determination
For the marketplace of ideas to function, there must be an
audience that receives the ideas and processes them. As Justice
Brennen put it, “It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had
only sellers and no buyers.”206 Any decision about whether to allow
regulation that impacts speakers and suppresses speech, must
consider the impact, positive or negative, on the audience for that
speech.
In other contexts, scholars have advocated for understanding
the limits of rationality and then adjusting regulations and
legislation to best position people to make rational decisions. 207 This
idea is more complicated if regulations would result in the
infringements of a First Amendment right. The high legal error
costs associated with attempting to craft legislation that suppresses
problematic or excessive information is particularly problematic
when there is little reason to assume that legislators or judges are
any better at avoiding the problematic irrational behavior than the
rest of the consumers in the marketplace of ideas.

204. See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and
Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U.
L. REV. 1033 (2012).
205. CAPLAN, supra note 170.
206. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
207. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 165.
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CONCLUSION

Law and economics does not necessarily lead to the simple
conclusion advocated in some judicial decisions that more speech is
always better. In certain circumstances, this approach suggests it is
appropriate to suppress speech because the high probability of
significant and imminent harm outweigh the loss of valuable
speech. This is consistent with most understandings of the value of
free speech, from Mill to Holmes, Jr. But one of the most important
aspects of Posner’s balancing test is the explicit calculation of legal
error costs.
In almost every instance above, the high likelihood of legal
error brought about by trying to target only specific speech that is
deemed problematic, while allowing valuable political speech to
reach the marketplace, leads to a conclusion that efficient
regulation is difficult if not impossible. For this reason, regulation
of corporate political speech is unlikely to be justified because the
valuable loss of information and the error costs associated with such
regulation will outweigh the benefits of keeping some harmful
speech from the marketplace.
One does not need Posner’s formula for this realization. Almost
every First Amendment case balances the need to suppress the
speech with the possibility of a limitation being either too broad or
too narrow. The chilling effect of legislation is an excellent example
of an economic externality, and the likelihood that a restriction
would end up suppressing too much speech has long been the best
rationale for striking down regulations on First Amendment
grounds. But applying the law and economics methodology and
viewing the regulation through the marketplace of ideas framework
show that legal error is consistently a problem when trying to justify
suppression based on the speech, the speaker, or the audience.
Although on each individual level, the legal error cost seems to
make justifying regulation difficult, an argument can be made that
isolating the variables downplays the significance of the problem.
After all, past regulations were not based just on the speech, or the
speaker, or the audience, but on a combination of all three. When
the harm brought about by potentially false political speech, made
by speakers with a unique ability to bring about corruption, and the
high likelihood of distortion, leading to irrational decisions and
inefficient political action is considered, this combination perhaps
increases the harm to a level where it could outweigh the
suppression of valuable speech. The problem is that combining the
variables does not simply multiply the harm; it also multiplies the
legal error. In order to avoid being over-inclusive, the regulation
would now need to target the problematic speech, from the
problematic speaker, that has the negative effect, all without
including or chilling other speech valuable to the marketplace of
ideas.
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As insights from behavioral economics and other research
continue to add to the understanding of consumer behavior in the
marketplace of ideas, it is important to revisit assumptions and
update calculations. However, paternalistic regulations aimed at
improving decision-making will always have to overcome the
criticism that the regulators are no less irrational than the audience
they are trying to protect.
Although the overall conclusion from the application of the
Posner balancing test to regulation of corporate political speech is
that such regulation is not justified, this could change with
additional evidence. An increase in false political speech would
reduce the value of the speech. Additional evidence of corruption
would increase the harm produced by such speech. So would
additional information about individual decision-making that
demonstrates that corporate political speech is uniquely likely to
lead to irrational political choices and inefficient political decisionmaking.
It is likely that courts in future corporate political speech cases
will continue to weigh the variables identified in this comment and
attempt to balance the harm brought about by such speech against
the loss of valuable speech brought about through suppression. This
comment makes clear that the legal error costs of attempting to
target specific speech without being over or under-inclusive should
and likely will always play a prominent role in the future
consideration of corporate political speech issues. Additionally, it is
clear that there are arguments within the existing rationale
accepted by the courts for protecting and suppressing corporate
political speech, but that future cases should be centered on
evidence of actual behavior by both corporate speakers and
audience members that allow for an appropriate valuation of both
the speech and the harm. Arguments about the extension of First
Amendment protections to corporations and distinct legal standing
of corporations should be replaced by more specific arguments about
the actual impacts of corporate political speech on the marketplace
of ideas and the ability of regulation to lead to more efficient results
for all involved.
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